Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

State of Utah v. Judy Gibson : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeanne B. Inouye; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Robert E.
Steed; Salt Lake County Attorney's Office; Counsel for Appellee.
Linda M. Jones; Salt Lake Defender Association; Counsel for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Gibson, No. 20080296 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/820

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

CaseNo.20080296-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

JUDY GIBSON,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to
unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony,
in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Ann Boy den presiding.
B. INOUYE (1618)
Assistant Attorney General
MARKL. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180

JEANNE

LINDA M. JONES
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Counsel for Appellant

ROBERT E. STEED
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
Counsel for Appellee

Oral Argument Requested

Case No. 20080296-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

JUDY GIBSON,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to
unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony,
in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Ann Boy den presiding.
JEANNE B. INOUYE

LINDA M. JONES
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Counsel for Appellant

(1618)
Assistant Attorney General
MARKL. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
ROBERT E. STEED
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
Counsel for Appellee

Oral Argument Requested

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT

8

IN HER PLEA STATEMENT, DEFENDANT AGREED TO PAY
RESTITUTION, ACKNOWLEDGED THE AMOUNT WAS DISPUTED,
AND AGREED TO HAVE THE COURT DETERMINE THE AMOUNT
AT A RESTITUTION HEARING; THUS, WHILE THE AMOUNT HAD
YET TO BE DETERMINED, DEFENDANT KNEW THE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA AND ENTERED IT KNOWINGLY

8

A. Defendant, who knew that the amount of restitution was
disputed and agreed in the plea statement to have the trial
court determine the amount at a restitution hearing, knowingly
entered her plea

10

B. A plea can be knowingly entered even when restitution has yet
to be determined. To hold otherwise would substantially and
unnecessarily limit the cases that could be resolved through
plea bargaining

13

1. A plea can be knowing even when entered without
knowledge of the amount of restitution that may be
required

13

2. As a matter of policy, this Court should not require that a
defendant know the amount of restitution before pleading
guilty

17

i

C. Moreover, in this case, defendant knew when she entered the
plea what she had taken and was therefore aware of the
amount of restitution she might be required to pay

19

D. Finally, in this case, the trial court strictly complied with rule
11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendant has not
rebutted the presumption that arose, upon the trial court's strict
compliance, that the plea was knowing and voluntary

20

CONCLUSION

21

ADDENDA
Addendum A - Utah R. Crim P. 11
Addendum B — Statement of Defendant in Support of Plea in Abeyance
Addendum C — Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
Addendum D - State v. Hensley, 2006 WL 771175 (Minn. App. 2006)
(unpublished)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)

11

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)

11

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)

10

Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992)

10

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)

20

STATE CASES

Alford v. State, 651 So.2d 1109 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994)

16

State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42,140 P.3d 1288
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d440 (Utah 1983)

2
11,12

State v. Chapman, 362 N.W.2d401 (Minn. App. 1985)

16

State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1 P.3d 1108

20

State v. Groppi, 840 A.2d42 (Conn. App. 2004)

14

State v. Hensley, 2006 WL 771175 (Minn. App. 2006) (unpublished)

ii, 15,16

State v. Hurt, 27 P.3d 1276 (Wash. App. 2001), overruled on other grounds
by In re Carlstad, 80 P.3d 587 (Wash. 2003)

15

State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986)

20

State v. King, 759 P.2d 1312 (Ariz. 1988)

17

State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12,26 P.3d 203
State v. Tracy, 869 P.2d 425 (Wash App. 1994)

20
17

State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,22 P.3d 1242

11

iii

STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (West 2004)

passim

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (West 2004)

1,2

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004)

9

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-203 West Supp. 2008)

18

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (West Supp. 2008)

13,14,18

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-401 (West Supp. 2008)

18

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (West Supp. 2008)

1

OTHER AUTHORITIES

W. LaFave et al, Criminal Procedure § 21.4(d) (3d ed. 2007)

iv

14

CaseNo.20080296-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

JUDY GIBSON,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to
unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Defendant entered a guilty plea knowing that the full amount of restitution
had yet to be determined and agreeing that the amount would be decided at a
restitution hearing.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied

defendant's motion to withdraw her plea, rejecting her claim that the plea was
constitutionally unknowing, simply because she did not know the restitution
amount?

Standard of Review. An appellate court will overturn a trial court's ruling on a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea only when it is convinced that the trial court has
abused its discretion. State v. Bedstead, 2006 UT 42, \ 7, 140 P.3d 1288. It will
disturb findings of fact made in connection with a ruling on a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea only if they are clearly erroneous. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, attached in Addendum A, is
relevant to the issue on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 3, 2004, the State charged defendant with unlawful dealing of
property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-513(2) and/or (3)(a) (West 2004), and with theft by deception, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (West 2004). R3-4.
On June 21,2004, with the assistance of counsel, defendant pleaded guilty to
unlawful dealing, and the State dismissed the theft by deception charge. R14. In the
plea statement, attached in Addendum B, defendant acknowledged that she could
"be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of [her] crime, including any
restitution that may be owed on charges that [were] dismissed as part of the plea
agreement/' R23. She agreed that "there [wa]s at least $55,220.00 due and owing in
this matter/' but that "due to a dispute over other amounts," "the amoimt of
2

restitution [would] be determined at [a restitution] hearing [to] cover the time
period April 7, 2002 to October 31, 2003." R24. In the plea statement, defendant
certified, "I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats,
or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty." R25.
The plea statement contained the following notice of defendant's right to
withdraw her guilty plea: "I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea, I
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea within 30 days after I have been
sentenced and final judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw
my plea if I show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30
days for any reason." R25-26.
The court ordered that the plea be held in abeyance for 36 months and placed
defendant on probation for 36 months. R14-15. The court ordered that defendant
pay full restitution as a condition of probation and scheduled a restitution hearing.
R15.
The restitution hearing was held October 8,2004. R39. Testimony was given
that defendant had taken $55,221 by using her aunt's credit cards, $93,000
($101,659.92 with interest) by mortgaging her aunt's home, and $81,305 by making
checks to herself from her aunt's bank account. R195:7,12, 16. On October 13, the
court entered a restitution order, setting the total amount of restitution at
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$238,184.92 and requiring that defendant pay $2500 per month beginning in
November 2004. R40.
Defendant subsequently contested the amounts and calculations upon which
the restitution order was based and moved to amend it. R42-47. The court denied
the motion, ruling that the issues raised in defendant's motion had been fully
addressed at the October 8 evidentiary hearing. R50.
On January 5, 2005, the State filed a motion for an order to show cause why
defendant should not be held in contempt for failing to make any of the monthly
restitution payments the court had ordered. R53. On March 3, defendant appeared
and admitted the allegations. R63. The court found defendant in violation of her
probation, revoked probation and the plea in abeyance, and reinstated them, for 36
months. R63-64. The court noted that $38,916.17 of the $238,184.92 restitution
amount was being held in trust for the benefit of the victim. R64. The court
therefore calculated the balance owing as $199,268.75 and ordered that defendant
pay at least $2500 per month beginning in April 2005 and on the last day of each
month thereafter. Id.
Almost a year later, on March 7, 2006, the State filed another order to show
cause, noting that defendant had made a payment of $18,316.29, which brought
restitution payments current through October 30, 2005, but that she had made no
further payments, thereby violating the court's March 3,2005 order. R69-71.
4

On June 22,2006, defendant, represented by new counsel, moved to withdraw
her guilty plea. R110. Defendant alleged that her plea was unknowing because the
total amount of restitution owing was "in dispute at the time of the plea" and that
she knew neither the total amount of restitution nor the amount that would be
required as monthly payments. R113, 115; see also R89-90 (defendant's affidavit
averring that she did not knowingly and intelligently enter plea). She also alleged
that the court had failed to advise her of the time limits within which to file a
motion to withdraw the plea. R113.
On December 4,2006, following briefing and oral argument on the matter, the
court entered an order, determining that it had jurisdiction to entertain defendant's
motion to withdraw, but concluding that defendant had pleaded knowingly. See
R142-52 (findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying motion to withdraw
guilty plea, attached in Addendum C). The court therefore denied the motion. See
id.
On June 18,2007, the court held a review hearing on the State's motion for an
order to show cause. Based on the parties' stipulation, the court held that defendant
had not complied with the plea in abeyance. R160. The court therefore entered
defendant's guilty plea and set a sentencing hearing. Rl60-61.
On March 17, 2008, the court held a sentencing hearing, and on March 18,
2008, the court entered judgment. R178-80. Defendant has not included a transcript
5

of that hearing in the record on appeal. The pleadings indicate that the court
sentenced defendant to a prison term of 1 to 15 years, suspended the prison term,
placed defendant on probation for 12 months, and ordered that defendant spend 30
days in jail and pay restitution as determined by her probation officer. Id. In a
"sentence trust note/' the court ordered, "[Restitution to be pursued civilly[;] any
credit card issues are not apart [sic] of criminal action." R179.
On April 8,2008, defendant timely appealed. R183.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Melba Wisdom was defendant's elderly and incapacitated aunt. R195:6.
Defendant took out credit cards in her aunt's name and used those cards to take
money from her aunt. R195:7; R196:6. Defendant took out a mortgage on her aunt's
home. R196:6. Defendant used proceeds from the mortgage for her own expenses.
Id. Defendant also made out checks to herself on her aunt's checking account and
signed the checks with her aunt's name. R195:15. Defendant used the proceeds
from the checks for herself. Id.1

1

Defendant's presentence report contains additional information regarding
the offenses. SeePSIat3-4.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion
to withdraw her plea. Defendant knew that, as a consequence of her plea,
restitution could be imposed. She knew that restitution could be imposed not only
for the criminal conduct to which she admitted, but also for charges dismissed as
part of the plea agreement. She agreed that at least $55,220 was owing. She
acknowledged that a dispute existed as to other amounts, and she agreed to have
the trial court determine the disputed amounts at a restitution hearing. Defendant
thus knew the consequences, including the restitution consequences, of entering the
plea. As a matter of policy, this court should decline to hold that a defendant must
know the amount of restitution before she can enter a knowing plea.

Such a

holding would substantially limit the cases in which a plea bargain could be offered.
Moreover, in this case defendant also knew what amounts she had
misappropriated and therefore knew what her liability might be. In addition, the
district court strictly complied with rule 11, thereby giving rise to a presumption
that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Defendant has presented no
evidence to rebut that presumption.

7

ARGUMENT
IN HER PLEA STATEMENT, DEFENDANT AGREED TO PAY
RESTITUTION, ACKNOWLEDGED THE AMOUNT WAS
DISPUTED, AND AGREED TO HAVE THE COURT
DETERMINE THE AMOUNT AT A RESTITUTION HEARING;
THUS, WHILE THE AMOUNT HAD YET TO BE DETERMINED,
DEFENDANT KNEW THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA
AND ENTERED IT KNOWINGLY
Defendant asserts that "the State failed to disclose information pertinent to
the terms of the [plea] agreement" and that she was thus "prevented from
understanding the terms at the time of the plea." Br. Appellant at 16 (capitalization
and boldface omitted). She claims that "the State's failure to disclose restitution
amounts at the time of the plea agreement prevented [her] from understanding or
knowing the consequences of the plea, or relevant terms of the agreement" and
prevented her "from entering into a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea
agreement." Id. at 26 (capitalization, italics, underlining, and boldface omitted).
Specifically, defendant claims that her plea could not have been knowing
because she was not informed that she might be ordered to pay restitution in the
amount of $238,184.92, an amount yet to be determined when she entered her plea.
See id. at 31. She claims that the order to pay this amount was a consequence of her
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plea of which she was unaware, that she unknowingly entered the plea without an
understanding of this consequence, and that the trial court therefore erred when it
denied her motion to withdraw the plea.2 See Br. Appellant at 40-43.
Defendant entered a knowing plea. Defendant knew that the amount of
restitution was disputed, but agreed, as part of the plea bargain, to have the trial
court determine the amount at a restitution hearing. Under such circumstances, she
made a voluntary and intelligent choice to enter the plea, rather than go to trial. At
least in most cases, a plea can be knowingly entered even when restitution has yet to
2

The plea in abeyance was entered on June 21,2004. Under Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-13-6, a motion to withdraw a plea in abeyance must be made within 30 days of
defendant's pleading guilty. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (West 2004).
Defendant did not file her motion to withdraw until June 22, 2006. Defendant's
plea statement, however, inaccurately informed defendant that she had to file a
motion to withdraw "within 30 days after [she] ha[d] been sentenced and final
judgment ha[d] been entered." R26. Defendant was not sentenced until March 18,
2008.
Under the rules of criminal procedure, "[fjailure to advise the defendant of
the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty... is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a
motion under Section 77-13-6." Rule 11(f), Utah R. Crim. P.
The trial court treated defendant's motion to withdraw as a motion to extend
the time for filing as well as a motion on the merits. See R143. For this reason, the
State does not contest the timeliness of defendant's motion to withdraw.
The State reserves the right, however, to argue in a future case that the
statutory jurisdictional time limit cannot be circumscribed by a court rule.

9

be determined. To hold otherwise would substantially and unnecessarily limit the
cases that could be resolved through plea bargaining.
In any case, defendant knew what she had taken and therefore knew the
amounts for which she might be responsible. Finally defendant has not rebutted the
presumption that arose, upon the trial court's strict compliance with rule 11, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the plea was knowing and voluntary.
A. Defendant, who knew that the amount of restitution was
disputed and agreed in the plea statement to have the trial
court determine the amount at a restitution hearing,
knowingly entered her plea.
This Court should reject defendant's claim. This case is not about the State's
failure to disclose information. Both parties knew that the restitution amount was in
dispute. Nothing in the record suggests that the State knew and hid information
that defendant did not possess. Rather, the issue here is whether the State can offer
and a defendant can knowingly enter a plea where the parties agree to have the trial
court determine a disputed restitution amount at a restitution hearing.
"The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is
'whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action open to the defendant/" Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,56
(1985) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,31 (1970)); see also Parke v. Raley,
506 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1992) (plea is valid when it is both knowingly and voluntarily

10

made); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) (United States Constitution
requires that guilty plea be intelligently and voluntarily entered).
To knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter a plea, a defendant must
understand the "direct consequences" or "basic consequences" of her decision to
plead guilty. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,755 (1970) (referring to a guilty
plea "entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences") (emphasis added);
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,111,22 P.3d 1242 (explaining that the purpose of rule 11,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is to help establish that a defendant knows her
rights and understands the "basic consequences" of her decision to plead guilty).
To enter a knowing and voluntary plea, a defendant should be aware of the
constitutional rights she is waiving when she enters a guilty plea, in particular, the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the
right to confront her accusers. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 243. She must also
"understand the nature and elements of the crime to which she [is pleading] guilty."
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440,443 (Utah 1983).
Defendant here understood the basic consequences of her plea. The plea
statement establishes that defendant knew what the bargain was with respect to her
sentence and other matters. She stated, "I know the maximum sentence that may be
imposed for each crime to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading
guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to
11

serving a mandatory penalty for that crime/' R23. She said that she knew that her
sentence could include a prison term, fine, or both, and that in addition to a fine, an
85% surcharge would be imposed. Id.
She also understood the consequences of her plea relevant to restitution. She
understood that she would have to pay restitution and that restitution could "be
owed on charges that [we]re dismissed as part of a plea agreement/' See R23-24.
She understood that the restitution amount for some of her criminal activities would
be $55,220. See R24. She also understood that the restitution amount for other
criminal activities was in dispute. See id. Understanding all of these matters, she
agreed to have the trial court determine the disputed and total amounts at a
restitution hearing. See R24.

She knew what the bargain was and how the

restitution amount would be determined. Significantly, while defendant could have
appealed the trial court's determination of the restitution amount, she did not. See
R40, 50.
Defendant's plea was not unknowing or involuntary because the amount of
restitution had yet to be determined. Defendant knew for exactly what conduct
over exactly what period of time restitution could be imposed. She also knew that
she was agreeing to have the court determine the amount of restitution after a
hearing on the matter.

12

B. A plea can be knowingly entered even when restitution has yet
to be determined. To hold otherwise would substantially and
unnecessarily limit the cases that could be resolved through
plea bargaining.
1. A plea can be knowing even when entered without
knowledge of the amount of restitution that may be
required.
A defendant can enter a knowing plea even when the amount of restitution
has yet to be determined. First, when entering a plea, a defendant gives up her right
to a trial and to those rights that would be constitutionally required at trial. See
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). She waives the right to have her guilt or innocence
determined by a fact finder. But she does not waive the rights that she would be
accorded at sentencing, including the right to challenge any restitution award and to
have a hearing on that issue. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (West Supp. 2008)
(providing for challenge to imposition, amount, or distribution of restitution and to
full hearing on the issue). Defendant's claim, that the plea cannot be knowing
unless a defendant knows, in advance, what restitution will be ordered, would
make the entry of the plea something more than a waiver of the right to trial. It
would make the entry of a plea insurance against the consequences and sentencing
risks that defendants routinely face after they have been convicted at trial.
Defendant has not explained why she should be entitled to such insurance upon
entering a plea, where her entry of the plea does not waive any right to challenge a

13

restitution order at sentencing or her entitlement to a restitution hearing if she
challenges the "imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution/'

Id.

Defendant, in fact, did challenge the restitution amount below. See R40, 50. She
could have, but did not, appeal the trial court's rulings on her challenges.
Moreover, while a defendant is entitled to know the basic or direct
consequences of pleading guilty, the entry of a plea need not insure against all
uncertainties. It is "simply impracticable for a trial judge to advise the defendant of
all possible consequences" of entering a plea. W. LaFave et al, Criminal Procedure
§ 21.4(d) (3d ed. 2007). Numerous jurisdictions accordingly have held that a
restitution obligation is not a basic consequence of pleading guilty, that the trial
court need not inform a defendant of the dollar amount of restitution before
accepting a plea, and that a defendant can enter a knowing plea even where that
dollar amount has not been ascertained.
For instance, in State v. Groppi, 840 A.2d 42,44-45 (Conn. App. 2004), the court
held that, while entry of a knowing plea required that "a defendant... be fully
aware of the direct consequences of his or her plea," restitution was not a direct
consequence of the plea itself. The court was therefore not required to ensure that
Groppi had a full understanding of the relationship between his guilty plea and
restitution. See id.

14

In State v. Hurt, 27 P.3d 1276, 1283 (Wash. App. 2001), overruled on other
grounds by In re Carlstad, 80 P.3d 587 (Wash. 2003), Hurt "argue[d] that his guilty
plea was not voluntary because he was not informed of the specifics of his
restitution/' The court rejected his argument, noting that "[t]he usual procedure is
for the precise amount of restitution to be determined at the time of sentencing, or
within a given period thereafter/' Id. at 1283-84. The court reasoned, "Mr. Hurt was
told he would be required to compensate the victim's family for their medical,
funeral, and similar expenses. That is enough to support the guilty plea." Id. at
1284.
In State v. Hensley, 2006 WL 771175 (Minn. App. 2006) (unpublished) (attached
in Addendum D), Hensley argued that he should have been allowed to withdraw
his guilty plea because, where restitution had not been reduced to a specific dollar
amount, "he was misled about the amount of restitution he was obligated to pay."
Id. The court rejected defendant's argument. The court observed that "the plea
agreement specifically addressed restitution and appellant was informed he would
be responsible for restitution on the dismissed counts, even though no specific
dollar amount of restitution was proposed." Id. The court held that, under the
circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hensley's
motion to withdraw because the record amply supported the trial court's

15

"conclusion that [Hensley] entered his guilty plea knowing that he would be
responsible for restitution on all charges in the complaint." Id.
In Alford v. State, 651 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994), Alford
"contend[ed] that his plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered
because... he was not informed of the large amoimt of restitution that would be
sought by the victim and, had he known of the amoimt of restitution being sought,
he would not have pleaded guilty." Id. The court rejected his claim, holding that
Alford "was fully aware of the consequences of his plea when it was entered. He
was not misled in any way. There is no constitutional requirement that an accused
be informed of every consequence of his guilty plea before the plea will be
considered intelligently entered." Id. at 1113.3

3

Defendant cites three cases from other jurisdictions to support her argument
that a defendant cannot enter a knowing plea unless she knows the amount of
restitution that may be imposed. See Br. Appellant at 26. Two of the cases are
distinguishable. In State v. Chapman, 362 N.W.2d 401 (Minn. App. 1985), the plea
agreement did not mention the amount of restitution. However, the issue before the
court was not whether the defendant had to be informed of the amoimt of
restitution prior to the plea, but whether "the trial court err[ed] in requiring
Chapman to make restitution of the sums alleged in the counts to which she did not
plead guilty" and on the basis of conduct for which she did not agree to pay
restitution. Id. at 403.

(Footnote continues on following page.)
16

2. As a matter of policy, this Court should not require that a
defendant know the amount of restitution before pleading
guilty.
Significantly, if this Court were to hold that a defendant could not enter a
knowing plea unless she were informed of the amount of restitution, it would
substantially limit the number of cases that could be resolved through plea
bargaining.

In many cases, at the time of the change-of-plea hearing, the

prosecution does not know what amount of restitution may be required to
compensate the victims for losses caused by the defendant. In some cases, where
victims require continuing medical and mental health treatment, that figure cannot
be known until after sentencing. If the prosecutor must provide an exact figure for
restitution or even a "ceiling" on restitution at the change-of-plea hearing, the
prosecutor may be reluctant to offer any plea. Likewise, the trial court, aware of its

Defendant also cites State v. Tracy, 869 R2d 425 (Wash. App. 1994). In Tracy,
the problem was not that the plea agreement did not apprise defendant of the
amount of restitution, but that the plea agreement did not advise defendant about
the possibility of restitution itself. Id. at 426. In the instant case, the plea statement
did, in fact, inform the defendant of the possibility of restitution.
Defendant's third case, State v. King, 759 P.2d 1312,1314 (Ariz. 1988), does
appear to support her argument. King is not controlling precedent in Utah and, as
explained in the foregoing analysis, is contrary to the precedent of many other
jurisdictions.

17

responsibilities to victims, may be reluctant to accept any plea, knowing that by
accepting the plea, the court may foreclose its avenues to fulfill its legal
responsibilities to victims.4
Moreover, defendant's claim that she could not enter a knowing plea that
included an agreement to have the trial court determine restitution at a restitution
hearing is inconsistent with statutory law that contemplates post-plea restitution
hearings. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-203 requires that a presentence report include a
victim impact statement regarding "the recommended amount of complete
restitution/' It would make little sense to require this information between a
change-of-plea hearing and sentencing if the amount of restitution had to be
determined prior to the entry of a plea. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 provides for a
full restitution hearing "at the time of sentencing" "[i]f the defendant objects to the
imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution/' Id. (emphasis added). It
4

For instance, the Crime Victims Restitution Act states that "in addition to
any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make
restitution to victims of crimes as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which
the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l). The Act further requires court to determine "complete
restitution" and "court-ordered restitution" and to "enter an order of complete
restitution . . . on the civil judgment docket." Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-302(2) &
401(1).
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would make likewise make little sense to provide for a hearing at the time of
sentencing if restitution had to be determined prior to the entry of a plea.
C Moreover, in this case, defendant knew when she entered the
plea what she had taken and was therefore aware of the
amount of restitution she might be required to pay.
Defendant can hardly argue surprise in this case. Defendant, better than
anyone else, knew the amounts she had taken by fraudulently using her
incapacitated aunt's credit cards, by making checks for her personal use against her
aunt's account, and by mortgaging her aunt's home and converting the proceeds to
her personal use. Defendant knew what she had taken and, therefore, knew the
amount of restitution that might be required. She knew what her misappropriations
were and she knew that they might be included in the amount of the restitution
order. As explained, defendant does not appeal the trial court's determination that
the restitution amount accurately reflected the value of the property
misappropriated. See R40,50. While defendant may have hoped that some of her
misappropriations would remain undiscovered, she cannot prevail on her claim that
her plea was unknowing because she was unaware of what restitution might be
required. While she asserts that the plea was unknowing, she has presented no
evidence to establish that it was, in fact, unknowing.
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D. Finally, in this case, the trial court strictly complied with rule
11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendant has not
rebutted the presumption that arose, upon the trial court's
strict compliance, that the plea was knowing and voluntary.
As explained, a plea is knowing if entered "'[with] understanding of the
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea/" Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 262 n.l (1971) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11). Courts in Utah have
determined that, in most cases, a defendant's plea will be knowing and voluntary if
entered by a court that has strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Strict compliance with rule 11(e), i.e., explaining a defendant's

constitutional rights and the consequences of pleading guilty, supports a
presumption that the plea was knowing and voluntary. See State v. Gamblin, 2000
UT 44,111,1 P.3d 1108; see also State v. Martinez, 2001UT12, % 22,26 P.3d 203 ("It is
well established that strict compliance with [rule 11(3), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure] creates a presumption that the plea was voluntarily entered.") (internal
quotation and citation omitted); State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Utah 1986)
(plurality opinion) (The primary purpose of rule 11(e) is "to insure that when a
defendant enters a guilty plea and thereby waives important constitutional rights,
such as the right to a jury trial, he or she acts freely and voluntarily, with full
knowledge of the consequences of the plea/'). Moreover, the rule provides that
"[ujnless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire
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into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea." Utah R. Crim. P.
11(e) (final paragraph).
Here, defendant does not allege that the trial judge did not strictly comply
with rule 11. The record, in fact, demonstrates that the judge did comply with that
rule. See R19-29 (plea statement); R196:3-6 (plea colloquy). The court ascertained
that defendant knew of the rights set forth in rule 11(e), understood the nature and
elements of the offense, and knew the minimum and maximum sentence that could
be imposed. R19-29; R196:3-6. The court further ascertained that there was a factual
basis for the plea. R20; R196:6. Based on that compliance, a presumption arose that
defendants plea was entered both voluntarily and knowingly. Defendant has
offered no evidence to rebut that presumption.
CONCLUSION
In sum, defendant entered a knowing plea. Defendant knew that the amount
of restitution was disputed, but agreed, as part of her plea bargain, to have the trial
court determine that amount. Defendant thus knew what the bargain was and
knew the consequence of entering her plea. Her claim, that a plea cannot be
knowing unless the amount of restitution has been ascertained, is counter to sound
policy as it would substantially reduce the cases in which a plea agreement could be
entered. It is also inconsistent with Utah's statutory law that contemplates post-plea
proceedings to determine restitution.
21

Moreover, in this case, defendant knew what her exposure was. She knew
what funds she had misappropriated and might be required to restore. Further, in
this case, the trial court strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The court's strict compliance gave rise to a presumption that the plea
was knowing and voluntary. Defendant has not rebutted that presumption.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted September iff , 2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

J E A N N R B . INOUYE

'

assistant Attorney General
Counsel Jfor Appellee
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Addendum A

Page 1 of2
Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be
required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or
guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by
reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear,
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A
defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than
felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a
written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and
may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the
right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right
to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that
the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a
substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if
so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the
plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a
written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant has
read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot
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understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or
translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or
advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea
of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may
be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise
the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is unlawful for the defendant to
possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render
the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea.
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or
recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other
charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court.
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
(i)(1)The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being
made by the prosecuting attorney.
(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the
parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance
of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and
defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea
agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either
affirm or withdraw the plea.
(j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a
conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right,
on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial
motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if
the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(I) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. Any
variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall
be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a
collateral attack on a guilty plea.
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STATE OF UTAH,
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vs.
JUDY GIBSON,

:
:
:

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF PLEA IN ABEYANCE
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

:

Criminal No. 041900692

:

Defendant.

:

I, JUDY GIBSON, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and that I
understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty to the following crime:
Crime & Statutory
Provision
A. UNLAWFUL DEALING OF
PROPERTY BY A
FIDUCIARY, §76-6-513(2)
and/or (3)(a), Utah Code Ann.
(1995, as amended)

Degree

T Felony

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
$10,000.00 fine and incarceration
for a term not less than one (1) year
nor more than 15 years

I have received a copy of the Information against me. I have read it, or had it
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime to which I am pleading guilty.
The elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty are:
I did knowingly or intentionally deal with property that had been entrusted to me as a fiduciary,
or property of a governmental entity, public monies, or of a financial institution, in a manner
which I knew was a violation of my duty and which involved substantial risk of loss or detriment
to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted; and/or acting as a
fiduciary, without permission of the owner of the property or some other person with authority to
give permission, pledged as collateral for a personal loan, or as collateral for the benefit of some
party, other than the owner or the person for whose benefit the property was entrusted, the
property that has been entrusted to the fiduciary.
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crime listed
above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of
other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept
my guilty plea and prove the elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty:
I took monies entrusted to me and mismanaged them and used a power of attorney to secure a
loan against Melba Wisdom's property without her permission.
Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under
the constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give
up all the following rights:
-2-

Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's
service to me.
I have not waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and
that I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty. I
also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea.
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is Richard Bird. My attorney and I
havefollydiscussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty plea.
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty.
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b)
my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to crossexamine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State
would pay those costs.
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Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have
a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself I also know that if
I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I
am presumed iimocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime. If I choose to
fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial At
a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each
juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be
admitting that I committed the crime stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
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Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime
to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory
penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my
sentence may include a prison term,fine,or both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed.
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crime, including any
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I
plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea(s) now may
result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading
guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences
would be inappropriate.
Plea bargain. My guilty plea is the result of a plea bargain between myself and the
prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are
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fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:
1. I will plead guilty to Count I, Unlawful Dealing of Property by a Fiduciary, a Second
Degree Felony.
2. Count II, Theft by Deception, a Second Degree Felony, will be dismissed.
3. The parties agree there is at least $55,220.00 due and owing in restitution in this
matter. However, due to a dispute over other amounts, a restitution hearing is requested by the
parties. The restitution amount to be determined at said hearing will cover the time period
-T^h^GOe to October 31,2003.
4. After determination at the restitution hearing, I will pay restitution in the amount of
. Said restitution will be paid at the rate of at least S^^QoO per month,
beginning one month from the date of the restitution hearing, and will be sent to the Medicaid
Fraud Control Unit, Attention: Linda Snow, 5272 College Drive, #200, Murray, Utah 84123, for
the benefit of Melba Wisdom to the various credit cards and other creditors identified at the
restitution hearing.
5. I will be placed on probation for 36 months, during which time I will remain a law
abiding citizen.
6. The State recommends no incarceration as long as defendant is in compliance with the
terms of the Plea in Abeyance.
7. The case will be dismissed upon successful completion of these terms.
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge
may do are not binding on the judge.
-6-

Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my ownfreewill and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those
contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I amfreeto change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
lam

years of age. I have attended school through the / S * ^ " grade. I can read and

understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided
to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would
impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of
any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I amfreeof any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent mefromunderstanding what I am doing or
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea, I must file a written motion
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to withdraw my plea within 30 days after I have been sentenced andfinaljudgment has
been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause. I will not
be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any reason.
Dated this j ^ / ^ d a y of

, 2004.

(.J^AJL,
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Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for JUDY GIBSON the defendant above, and that I know
she has read the statement or that I have read it to her; I have discussed it with her and believe
that she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent.
To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the
crime and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these,
along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing
affidavit, are accurate and true.

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against JUDY GIBSON,
defendant I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant andfindthat the factual basis of the
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense is true and correct No improper
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant The plea
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence
would support the conviction of defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered and that the
acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest.

(jUo
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PROSECUTION ATTORNEY
Bar No. 5069

Order

Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the
signatures andfindsthat the defendant's guilty plea isfreely,knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty plea to the crime set forth in the
Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this ^ ? / day of

Hf^^t^ ^

^

JUDGE

11/2001
h:gibson\stmtofdefinguiltyplea.2001/06-16-04
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA
Criminal No. 041900692

vs.
JUDY GIBSON,
Defendant.

Judge Ann Boyden

Defendant, Judy Gibson, filed a Motion to Withdraw her Guilty Plea to one count of
Exploitation of an Elder Adult, a Second Degree Felony. The State of Utah filed a written
memoranda in response to the motion and oral argument was heard on October 2,2006. The
defendant was present and was represented by Gretchen Havner and Bevan Corry of the Salt
Lake Legal Defender's Office. The State of Utah was represented by Robert E. Steed, Assistant
Attorney General. Based upon the pleadings on file, the evidence adduced, and

argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby makes the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
JURISDICTION
The Court finds that defendant's Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea was timely made.
Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to address defendant's motion. The Court notes that in
response to the defendant's motion, the State conceded that the notice contained in the plea
agreement pertaining to defendant's right to file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea erroneously
stated that the defendant had to file any motion to withdraw her guilty plea within thirty days of
the imposition of sentence. However, the law in effect when the plea was entered provided that
'Tor a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of
pleading guilty or no contest." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2004). However, the State
suggested that the remedy for this error could be cured by allowing the defendant to file a motion
to extend the time to file her motion. The Courtfindsthat based on the notice contained in the
plea agreement, defendant's motion was timely filed. Accordingly, the Court will address
defendant's motion on its merits.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On February 3,2004, the State filed an Information charging the defendant with one
count of Unlawful Dealing of Property by a Fiduciary, a second degree felony and one
count of Theft by Deception, a second degree felony.

2.

On April 5,2004, the defendant made an initial appearance before the Court. Defendant
was represented by counsel, Richard L. Bird. On May 25,2004, the defendant

knowingly waived her right to a preliminary hearing and the case was bound over for
trial.
On June 21,2004, the defendant appeared with counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the
charge of Unlawful Dealing of Property by a Fiduciary, a Second Degree Felony. The
State and the defendant submitted a Statement of Defendant in Support of Plea in
Abeyance and Certificate of Counsel. The Court questioned the defendant to ascertain
whether she understood the legal consequences of entering a plea and to determine
whether the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. After the Court was satisfied
that the defendant was fully advised of her rights and consequences of entering a guilty
plea, the Court accepted the defendant's plea and found that it was knowingly and
voluntarily entered.
Page 6 of the written plea in abeyance agreement contains the following terms and
conditions that pertain defendant's obligation to pay restitution to the victim of her
conduct:
3. The parties agree there is at least $55,220.00 due and owing in restitution in this
matter. However, due to a dispute over other amounts, a restitution hearing is
requested by the parties. The restitution amount to be determined at said hearing
will cover the time period April 7,2002 to October 31,2003.
4. After determination at the restitution hearing, I will pay restitution in the
amount of $
. Said restitution will be paid at the rate of at least
$
.00 per month, beginning one month from the date of the restitution
hearing, and will be sent to the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit...
-3-

In exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the State agreed to move to dismiss the remaining
count in the Information.
Page 7 of the plea agreement contains the following notice of defendant's right to
withdraw her guilty plea:
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea, I must file a written motion
to withdraw my plea within 30 days after I have been sentenced and final judgement
has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause. I
will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any reason.
During the plea colloquy, the defendant denied at that time that she was under any undue
influence or coercion to plead guilty. The written plea agreement also contained
certification of voluntariness, attested to by the defendant, wherein she acknowledged that
she was voluntarily entering into a plea agreement with the State of her ownfreewill and
choice and that no "force, threats, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made"
to compel her to plead guilty."
On October 8,2004, a restitution hearing was held and evidence was received by the
Court. The Court heard testimonyfromOfficer Charles Haussler, an investigator with the
Medicaid Fraud Unit of the Attorney General's Office. The defendant was present with
counsel and also testified on her own behalf. Based on the evidence, the Court made
findings and ordered that the defendant pay restitution in the amount of $238,184.92.
Further, the Court ordered that the defendant make restitution payments of $2,500 per
month beginning on November 30, 2004.
-4-

On November 3,2004, the defendant filed a Motion to Amend the Restitution Order.
The State responded in writing to the motion. After considering the merits of the
defendant's motion, the Court denied the motion on November 8,2006. (Docket at 5-6.)
The defendant did not file an appeal of the Court's restitution order or the denial of
defendant's motion to modify that order.
On January 4,2005, the State filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause with the Court
based on the defendant's alleged failure to make restitution payments. On February 28,
2005, an Order to Show Cause hearing was conducted and the defendant entered
admissions to the allegations contained in the State's motion. The Court revoked and
reinstated the defendant's plea in abeyance. (Docket at 6.) The defendant did not appeal
the court's order with respect to the Order to Show Cause.
On April 14, 2006, the State filed a second Order to Show Cause. A hearing on the
State's motion was conducted on March 20, 2006. On that date, defendant's counsel,
Richard Bird, withdrew from the case. The Court continued the hearing and appointed
the Salt Lake Legal Defenders to represent the Defendant on March 28, 2006.
On June 22, 2006, the second Order to Show Cause hearing was conducted. The State
presented evidence in support of its motion. On the same date, the defendant filed a
motion to withdraw her guilty plea claiming that her plea was not knowingly or
voluntarily entered based on the fact that the plea agreement failed to specify a final
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restitution amount. The defendant also claimed that her plea was involuntary because she
was coerced into signing the agreement by her former counsel, Richard Bird. The
defendant alleges via affidavit that her former counsel told her in June of 2004 that she
had the choice of entering the plea agreement or going instantly to jail
13.

Oral argument on defendant's motion to withdraw was heard on October 2,2006. Both
the State and the defendant were also permitted to provide evidence in support or against
the defendant's motion. The defendant did not provide any additional evidence
pertaining to her claim that she was coerced by former defense counsel, Richard Bird,
into entering the plea agreement on June 21,2004. Further, defense counsel advised the
Court that the State did not need to call Richard Bird to testify concerning defendant's
claims of coercion though Mr. Bird was present and available to testify. No additional
evidence was introduced at the hearing.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The issue before the Court is whether the defendant's guilty plea on June 21, 2004 was

knowingly and voluntarily entered. The defendant contends that the plea agreement she signed
failed to specify the total amount of restitution that was owing, as well as her monthly obhgation
to make payments towards the total restitution amount. Consequently, the defendant claims that
the plea agreement violated Rule 11(e)(6) which requires that the defendant be aware of the plea
negotiations and what agreement has been reached prior to entering a plea. Absent a final

-6-

restitution amount in the plea agreement, the defendant argues that she was not in a position to
know whether her compliance with the plea agreement was possible. The defendant argued that
the lack of specificity is particularly important with respect to a plea in abeyance because the
defendant's compliance with the terms and conditions of the agreement would determine whether
the case is ultimately dismissed or whether a conviction is entered.
The disputed language of the plea agreement states:
3. The parties agree there is at least $55,220.00 due and owing in restitution in this
matter. However, due to a dispute over other amounts, a restitution hearing is
requested by the parties. The restitution amount to be determined at said hearing
will cover the time period April 7,2002 to October 31,2003.
4. After determination at the restitution hearing, I will pay restitution in the
amount of $
. Said restitution will be paid at the rate of at least
$
.00 per month, beginning one month from the date of the restitution
hearing, and will be sent to the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit...
While the total restitution amount was not stipulated to along with the defendant's monthly
restitution payment amount, it is apparent that the parties understood and agreed to further
litigate this issue with the Court. The defendant signed the plea agreement stating that she knew
and understood that she owed restitution to the victim, including a minimum amount of $55,220.
The defendant also understood that there was a dispute as to the final amount owing and
agreed that a restitution hearing would be held to determine thefinalrestitution amoimt. In fact,
a restitution hearing was scheduled following the entry of defendant's plea. The agreement
further states that the state is limited to a specified time period in which to present additional
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evidence relating to restitution. The agreement does not necessarily work to either parties
advantage or disadvantage because neither party knew at the time of the entry of the plea what
thefinalrestitution amount would be.
Rule 11(e)(6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that before accepting a
guilty plea, the Court must find that "if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion
and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached." The Court is satisfied based
on the language of the plea agreement that the defendant understood what it was she was
agreeing to. The Court finds that Rule 11(e)(6) does not require that restitution be determined to
the last detail before a defendant can enter into a plea agreement, whether it be a plea in abeyance
or a regular plea. The Court notes that restitution hearings are often required or requested
following entry of a plea and the law provides a means for the Court to address restitution issues
following a guilty plea. Pursuant to section 77-2a-3(5)(b)(2002), the court may upon acceptance
of a plea in abeyance agreement order that restitution be paid to victims "as provided in Title 77,
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act." See, Utah Code Ann. §77-2a-3(5)(b) (2002). If a
dispute exists over restitution, the Court shall conduct a hearing to determine the amount of
restitution that is owing. See, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38(a)-302(4)(2003),and § 77-2a3(5)(b)(2004).
The Court also finds that the mere fact that this was a plea in abeyance agreement rather
than an ordinary plea agreement does not alter the Court's analysis. A plea in abeyance is
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different in one aspect from an ordinary plea agreement because a plea in abeyance agreement
allows the Court to withhold entering judgment for a specified period of time during which the
defendant must comply with certain terms and conditions. If the defendant complies with the
agreement, the plea may be ultimately withdrawn and the charges that were pled to can be
dismissed or reduced according to the agreement. However, asidefromthis difference, a plea in
abeyance is still a plea of guilty or "no contest" and requires that the Court comply with the same
rules and Constitutional protections as are found in an ordinary plea agreement. In the instant
case, the plea in abeyance agreement advises the defendant of the charges against her and advises
her of all of the rights she is entitled to under the Constitution and all the rights she would be
giving up by entering a plea of guilty. The agreement also contains a factual basis for
defendant's plea and explains what the State is agreeing to in exchange for defendant's guilty
plea, including the dismissal of other charges that were filed against the defendant.
In short, the Court treats a plea in abeyance agreement the same as an ordinary plea
agreement and must assure that the defendant is afforded all of the same protections and rights
and complies with the same rules as with any other plea. In the instant case, the Court entered
the defendant's plea only after being satisfied that the defendant was advised of her rights and
that her plea complied with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Following the entry of the plea, a restitution hearing was conducted and the Court
determined the full restitution amount and established the monthly payment schedule the

-9-

defendant was to comply with. The Court notes that the defendant did not file an appeal to
challenge the Court's restitution order. Moreover, the defendant did not appeal a subsequent
order by the Courtfindingher in violation of her plea agreement for failure to comply with the
Court's Order on restitution. However, the issue before the Court is not the final restitution
amount, nor the fact that the restitution hearing went one way or the other, but whether the
defendant knowingly entered into the agreement with the restitution amount to be determined at
the restitution hearing. The Court finds that the defendant's entry of this plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered with respect to that issue.
The Court also finds that defendant's claim that she was coerced into entering by her
former counsel is without merit. The record reflects that during the plea colloquy the Court
specifically asked the defendant whether she was pleading guilty of her ownfreewill and she
responded affirmatively. Furthermore, based on the pleadings of the party and the statements of
defense counsel during oral argument effectively withdrawing this as a claim before the Court, I
find that the defendant's plea was voluntarily made and was not the result of coercion or undue
influence from any source. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea is
denied.

^mw yl
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ORDERED this26_ day of November, 2006.
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JUDGE ANN BOYDEti'. .-, y
DISTRICT COURT J U D O r E . ' S ^ ^
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I hereby certify that on this 16th day of November, 2006,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea,
postage prepaid, to:
The Honorable Ann Boyden
Third Judicial District Court
450 S State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gretchen Havner
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defenders
424 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

applied the law and did not abuse its discretion, we
affirm.
FACTS

NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED AS
UNPUBLISHED AND MAY NOT BE CITED
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY MINN. ST. SEC.
480A.08(3).
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,
v.
Robert HENSLEY, Appellant (A04-1483);
Robert Hensley, petitioner, Appellant,
v.
State of Minnesota, Respondent (A05-896).
Nos. A04-1483, A05-896.
March 28, 2006.
Pine County District Court, File No. K7-03-368.
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and
John K. Carlson, Pine County Attorney, Steven C.
Cundy, Assistant County Attorney, Pine City, MN,
for respondent.
John M. Stuart State Public Defender, James R.
Peterson, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis,
MN, for appellant.
Considered and decided by DIETZEN, Presiding
Judge; WRIGHT, Judge; and WORKE, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DIETZEN, Judge.
*1 In this consolidated direct and postconviction
appeal, appellant challenges the district court orders
and judgments
denying
his
petition
for
postconviction relief and determining restitution,
arguing that the district court erred by: (1) refusing to
allow withdrawal of his guilty plea; (2) ordering
appellant to pay restitution of $11,200; and (3)
denying his request for an evidentiary hearing.
Because we conclude that the district court properly

© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West.

In April 2003, appellant Robert Hensley was charged
with second-degree burglary in violation of
Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2 (2002), and offering a
forged check in violation of Minn.Stat. g 609.631.
subd. 3 (2002), after he was identified in a
surveillance video forging checks taken during a
March 31, 2003 burglary. In searches of appellant's
hotel room and vehicle, law enforcement officers
discovered stolen property belonging to the burglary
victims.
Following the burglary, the victims submitted an
Inventory of Loss form to the sheriffs department
listing the stolen property. The form included
estimated values for some, but not all, of the
property, which totaled $3,250.
In October 2003, appellant, represented by legal
counsel, signed a plea petition. The petition indicated
that appellant would plead guilty to an amended
count of receiving stolen property; and that the
parties would recommend that appellant receive a 21month sentence and pay restitution "on all charges in
[the] complainf'At the plea hearing, appellant
confirmed that there would be "restitution on all
charges [sic] that ... were dismissed."The district
court clarified that restitution was for both the forged
checks and the property stolen from the victims'
residence, and appellant indicated that he understood.
When the district court ordered a pre-sentence
investigation (PSI), appellant's counsel requested that
the investigation consider reducing the amount of
restitution by the value of the items recovered from
appellant.
The victims submitted an Affidavit for Restitution to
the district court. The affidavit included $6,720 in
lost wages, $6,000 in jewelry, $5,000 of tools, $3,000
for 400 movies, $300 in personal belongings, and
$600 for a pager. The total loss was estimated at
$21,620, and was not covered by insurance. The PSI
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recommended that appellant pay the amount of
restitution stated in the affidavit.
Following a sentencing hearing, appellant received a
19-month sentence and was ordered to pay $22,150
in restitution. Appellant requested, and the district
court ordered, a hearing to determine the amount of
restitution.
At the restitution hearing, one of the victims testified
in support of the total amount of restitution requested
in the affidavit; for lost wages for the four months
she did not attend work so that the home was
protected from theft; and for nearly $800 of forged
checks that were cashed and not reimbursed by her
bank. The victim also explained that the initial
Inventory of Loss form was completed before she
had a chance to thoroughly search their home for
missing items and determine the value of the stolen
property.
*2 The district court ordered restitution in the amount
of $11,200. This amount was based on $6,000 for the
stolen jewelry; $3,500 for tools; $1,200 for movies;
$300 for personal belongings; and $200 for the pager.
The district court rejected the claim for lost wages.
Appellant appealed the order for restitution, but then
filed a motion to stay the appeal and remand for
postconviction proceedings, which this court granted.
In March 2005, appellant filed his petition for
postconviction relief, challenging the amount of
restitution, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and
vacate his conviction based on the amount of
restitution, and requesting an evidentiary hearing.
The district court summarily denied the petition
without holding an evidentiary hearing.
DECISION
A petition for postconviction relief is a collateral
attacks on the judgment, which carries a presumption
of regularity and, therefore, cannot be lightly set
aside. Pederson v. Stale, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163
(Minn.2002). This court will not disturb the decision
of a postconviction court unless the court abused its
discretion. Dukes v State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 251
(Minn.2001). This court reviews "a postconviction
court's findings to determine whether there is
sufficient evidentiary support in the record" and will
not reverse a district court's findings of fact unless
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they are clearly erroneous. Id. Conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo. Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333.
338 (Minn.2003).
L
Appellant raises three issues on appeal. First,
appellant argues that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. Specifically, appellant argues that he was
misled about the amount of restitution he was
obligated to pay. Respondent contends that
appellant's plea was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent; and that appellant explicitly agreed that he
would be responsible for restitution on all charges in
the complaint, not just those amounts for which he
admitted liability.
Whether a district court properly denied a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263,
266 (Minn. 1989). A criminal defendant has no
absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once it is
entered. State v. Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d 323. 326
(Minn.2004). But a defendant may withdraw a guilty
plea if withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice. Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.05. subd. 1; Alanis v.
State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998) (stating that
burden of proof to establish basis for plea withdrawal
rests with defendant). Manifest injustice exists when
a defendant can show that a guilty plea was not
"accurate, voluntary, and intelligent (i .e., knowingly
and understanding^ m&do)" Perkins v. State, 559
N.W.2d 678. 688 (Minn. 1997).
The crux of appellant's argument is that his guilty
plea must be withdrawn because he was only
obligated to pay restitution for the amounts for which
he admitted liability, and not for all amounts charged
in the complaint. But this argument is contradicted by
the record. The plea petition explicitly states that
appellant would be responsible for restitution "on all
charges in [the] complaint," which included the
second-degree burglary charge. At the plea hearing,
appellant, who was represented by counsel, stated
several times that he understood that restitution
would be on all charges in the complaint. On this
record, appellant's guilty plea was made knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently. See State v. Ecker, 524
N.W.2d 712. 719 (Minn. 1994) (holding that
contested plea was voluntary because defendant
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repeatedly stated on record that he was making his
own decision).
*3 Appellant nonetheless argues that his guilty plea
was not valid because he believed that the restitution
would not be more than the value of the items listed
in the Inventory of Loss form. Appellant relies on
two cases to support the invalidity of his guilty plea.
See State v. Noreen, 354 N.W.2d 77
(Minn.App. 1984); see also State v Chapman, 362
N.W.2d401 (Minn.App.1985), review denied (Minn.
May 1, 1985). In Noreen, this court considered the
issue of restitution not bargained-for in the plea
agreement where the district court ordered restitution
of $2,000 at sentencing. 354 N.W.2d at 78.This court
remanded for resentencing, stating "the defendant
must understand the consequences of his plea. In this
case, the trial court imposed additional conditions of
probation which were not contemplated by the plea
agreement."/** (citation omitted).
In Chapman, the central issue was restitution ordered
on dismissed counts. 362 N.W.2d at 403.In that case,
the defendant contemplated owing restitution on the
two counts to which she pleaded guilty and, prior to
sentencing, no mention was made of restitution on
the six counts to be dismissed. Id Thus, this court
held that the $31,000 difference between what the
defendant contemplated as restitution for the charged
counts and the amount ordered at sentencing, which
included the dismissed counts, so substantially
exceeded the terms of the plea agreement that it was
not voluntarily and intelligently entered. Id at 404.
But Noreen and Chapman are easily distinguishable.
Here, unlike Noreen, the plea agreement specifically
addressed restitution and appellant was informed that
he would be responsible for restitution on the
dismissed counts, even though no specific dollar
amount of restitution was proposed. 354 N.W.2d at
78.And, unlike Chapman, the amount of restitution
contemplated by appellant, i.e., the $3,250 amount in
the Inventory of Loss form, was not justified on this
record. A review of the Inventory of Loss form
reveals that it was a preliminary document, i.e., that it
was cursory and incomplete. Appellant's counsel
acknowledged at the plea hearing that the amount of
restitution would be investigated and set forth in the
PSI. Thus, we reject appellant's argument that he was
misled about the consequences of his guilty plea.
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We believe the conclusion that appellant entered his
guilty plea knowing that he would be responsible for
restitution on all charges in the complaint is amply
supported by the record. Therefore, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's
request to withdraw his guilty plea.

n.
Second, appellant argues that the evidence in the
record does not support the district court order of
restitution in the amount of $11,200. Respondent
contends that the victim's testimony was sufficient to
establish the property that was stolen and its
approximate value.
Under Minnesota law, when an offender is convicted
of a crime, the victim has a right to restitution,
including but not limited to "out-of-pocket losses
resulting from the crime[.1"Minn.Stat. § 611A.04,
subd. 1(a) (2004). The sentencing court has wide
discretion in ordering and determining the
appropriate amount of restitution. State v. Anderson.
507 N.W.2d 245, 246 (Minn.App. 1993), review
denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 1993). But the record must
provide a factual basis for the amount awarded by
showing the nature and amount of losses with
reasonable specificity. State v. Thole, 614 N.W.2d
231. 234 (Minn.App.2000).
*4 An offender who challenges the propriety of
including in a restitution order particular items or the
dollar amounts of those items has the burden of
producing evidence to support the challenge.
Minn.Stat. § 611A.045. subd. 3(a) (2004). The
ultimate burden of establishing the appropriateness
and the amount of restitution is on the prosecution.
Id "A dispute as to the proper amount or type of
restitution must be resolved by the court by the
preponderance of the evidence."/**
Here, one of the victims testified at the restitution
hearing as to the stolen property and its approximate
value. She described with specificity the items that
were stolen, and the actual value of many of the items
based on her recollection of purchasing the items, the
replacement cost, or catalog pricing. She explained
that some of the values were estimates because her
receipts were taken during the burglary, and many
items were purchased overseas. She explained that
the amount shown in the initial Inventory of Loss
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form was low because it was made without knowing
the fUll extent of the loss and without an opportunity
to study the value of the items.
Appellant argues that the victim's testimony was
unsubstantiated, and therefore, the state did not meet
its burden. But this court has allowed restitution that
is supported by affidavits, claim forms, or testimony.
See e.g., State v. O'Brien, 459 N.W.2d 131, 133
(Minn.App. 1990) (finding sufficient evidence based
on victim's affidavit of costs and testimony). Here,
the only two witnesses at the restitution hearing were
appellant and the victim. On matters of credibility,
we defer to the district court. State v. Dickerson, 481
N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 19921 We conclude that the
determination of the district court is supported by the
record.
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*5 Affirmed.
Minn.App.,2006.
State v. Hensley
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2006 WL
(Minn.App.)
END OF DOCUMENT

III.
Third, appellant argues that the district court abused
its discretion when it denied his request for an
evidentiary hearing on his petition for postconviction
relief because he placed material facts in dispute
regarding the validity of his guilty plea.
The district court must grant an evidentiary hearing
for a postconviction appeal "[u]nless the petition and
the files and records of the proceeding conclusively
show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief
n"Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2004). An
evidentiary hearing is necessary when there is a
material issue of fact in dispute. State ex rel Roy v.
Tahash 277 Minn. 238, 244-45, 152 N.W.2d 301,
305-06 (1967). To place material facts in dispute, the
petitioner must allege facts that, if proven, would
entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. Fratzke v.
State.
450
N.W.2d
101,
102
(Minn. 1990)."f Allegations raised in the petition
must be more than argumentative assertions without
factual support"Sutherlin v. State, 574 N.W.2d 428,
436 (Minn. 1998) (citation omitted).
Here, the record is clear that appellant was informed
prior to entering his guilty plea that restitution would
be required on all counts charged in the complaint.
Consequently, appellant's reliance on the amount
stated in the Inventory of Loss form was unjustified.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the request for an evidentiary hearing.
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